In a setting of R&D co-opetition we study, by using an all-pay auction approach, how collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest, and how the latter influences the possible collaboration network structures the firms can hope to form. The all pay auction approach allows us to 1) endogenize both network formation and R&D intensities and 2) take heterogeneous and private valuations for patents into account. We find that, different from previous literature, the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable network, even and especially if the benefits from cooperating are important. Interestingly, the other possible stable networks all have the realistic property that some firms decide not to participate in the contest. Thus, weak cooperation through network formation can serve as a barrier to entry on the market for innovation. We further show that there need not be any network that survives a well known refinement of pairwise stability, strong stability, which imposes networks to be immune to coalitional deviations.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that …rms invest in R&D in order to increase their competitiveness and market power. Especially for high-tech sectors, …rms are typically engaged in R&D contests in order to be the …rst, and maybe the only, to develop a new product/technology. In such an environment …rms generally have the opportunity to develop some degree of collaboration. Historically, the literature modelling R&D competition has focused mainly on the two extremes of the collaboration spectrum: pure R&D competition (patent race, contest etc.) or full R&D cooperation (R&D Partnerships, Research Joint Ventures). That is, situations in which …rms are either friends or foes.
1 Recentely, more attention has been devoted to instances in which …rms are both friends and foes: intermediate forms of collaboration in which …rms cooperate to strengthen their joint position in R&D contests, without sharing the bene…ts of winning the contest.
Nonetheless, the last decades witnessed an increasing number of R&D partnerships even among competing …rms (OECD [2001] ). Second, it is shown (Greenlee [2005] ) that …rms adopt two types of cooperation: either …rms build [2006] who show also that the share of weak partneships in the Biotech and Pharmaceutical sectors has been increasing during the last years.
Independently of the form of collaboration, it is clear that …rms cannot keep up with their competitors without cooperating and competing with them at the same time. For example, Anand & Khanna [2000] show that in the Electronics and Computer sectors competing …rms usually cooperate via cross licensing even for technologies not yet developed.Cohen et al. [2002] …nd that not even high-tech but also low-tech Japanese …rms usually cooperate through cross licensing and other forms of information sharing more often and more extensively than U.S. …rms. 1 In particular, the latter stream of research has mainly focused on the welfare and/or the antitrust implication of Research Joint Ventures. See Caloghirou et al. [2003] & Hagerdoon et al. [1999] for a survey on research partnerships.
Given these stylized facts a …rst goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework to analyze sectors featured by "R&D co-opetition", namely sectors where …rms cooperate in R&D before competing with one another for the development of a new technology/product. In such a setting, two related questions arise quite naturally: First, how does (weak) cooperation bene…t …rms in the competition stage and how does that in ‡uence R&D activity? Second,
given the impact cooperation has on R&D activity, what are the likely patterns of cooperation that will emerge?
A great deal of literature has focused on (a part of) this issue, but, as far as we know, these two questions have not yet been analyzed jointly. Among the papers that analyze patent races and R&D cooperation at the same time (e.g. Martin [1995] and [2002] , Stein [2008] ) the contributions which are closer to ours are Goyal & Joshi [2006] and Joshi [2008] . Both these papers propose a two stage game model where in the …rst stage …rms cooperate in R&D while in the second they participate in a patent race contest à la Loury [1979] .
Goyal & Joshi [2006] study endogenous network formation in a context of a patent race where the R&D investment is exogenously given. In other words question two has been answered …xing R&D behaviour exogenously. Their main …nding is that the complete network is the only one to be pairwise stable when the linking costs are low. On the other hand, Joshi [2008] , in a similar setting, studies coalition formation game with endogenous R&D e¤ort. Joshi thus answers the two questions simultanously but coalition formation implies that …rms strongly cooperate such that they both share the prize and coordinate the R&D e¤ort at the coalition level. 2 Similarly to the previous paper, Joshi …nds that, as the cost of participating in a coalition is low, the grand coalition is the only one to be pairwise stable. In both papers the value of the patent is treated to be the same for all …rms and moreover it is common knowlegde. One contribution of our paper is to introduce heterogenous valuations for patents.
We answer the two above mentioned questions by developing a two stage game. In the …rst one, we consider a network game where …rms can form links with one another where a link a¤ects (increases) the expected value of the bene…ts of winning the patent game. In the second stage, …rms are involved in a patent contest which is in ‡uenced by the network structure realized in the former stage. Di¤erently from Goyal & Joshi [2006] and Joshi [2008] we formalize such stage as an all-pay auction rather than a classical patent race.
The reason behind this is threefold. First, weak cooperation allows …rms to increase their expected valuation for a patentable invention. This can be due to the fact that …rms assess the future market for their potential patented product di¤erently, that they draw di¤erent marginal costs, etc. In order to capture this e¤ect, we need to allow for the possibility that …rms di¤er in their valuation for the bene…ts of obtaining a patent. When potential bene…ts are di¤erent among the various competitors, this will likely have an impact on the e¤orts dedicated to innovation. Moreover, since this valuation is usually private information, modeling the patent game as an all-pay auction with private information allows us to take this into account.
Second, since we wish to model the incentive to form weak R&D links before entering into the patent game, the expected payo¤s of the latter will play a major role in deciding which links to form. In order to perform this backward induction approach, the expected payo¤s of the patent game need to be tractable. As has been pointed out by Joshi [2008] in a model of coalition formation in a race, when research intensities are chosen non-cooperatively in a classic patent race in which all …rms equally value the bene…ts from the patent the equilibrium is no longer tractable. The all-pay auction with private information allows us to circumvent this problem by using the results of Parreiras and Rubinchik [2006] .
Third, from a methodological point of view, as has been pointed out by Baye and Hoppe [2003] there is quasi-equivalence 3 between classic patent races and rent seeking games, of which all pay auction is a special case through assuming that the …rm with the highest R&D e¤ort wins the patent game with probability one. 4 Hence, even though modelling the patent game as an all pay auction may seem, at …rst sight, an oversimplifaction, it allows us to take a more general approach by taking heterogenous and private valuations for a patent into account, while maintaining the spirit of the classic patent race (Loury) and, by doing so, study the stability of weak R&D networks.
Once we have answered the above questions, it will be clear that when a …rm decides to engage in R&D cooperation with a …rm, this will a¤ect the expected pro…ts of all its (potential) rivals in the R&D contest. Network formation makes a …rm stronger with respect to others and this may lead some rivals to decide not to invest in R&D by exiting the market for innovation. Hence cooperation through networks has the potential to act as a barrier to entry. Given this we 3 In fact, in the limit where the interest rate is equal to zero, there exists an isomorphism between the classic patent races and rent seeking contests. 4 One could weaken the probability one assumption by mixing the all pay auction with a lottery, but this would only complicate the analysis without changing the qualitative results.
wish to know if this potential barrier to entry can arise in equilibrium. If the answer is yes, then we provide an alternative explanation for why some …rms may decide not to incur R&D e¤orts, even though all …rms started o¤ on equal foot. In this situation, one may worry about a potential negative e¤ect of weak cooperation: by creating barrier of entry on the market for innovation, does it reduce e¢ ciency?
Our main results are as follows. First we show that our set up allows us to endogenize both R&D e¤ort and network formation. Second, like Goyal & Joshi [2006] and Joshi [2008] we …nd that the complete network is always pairwise sta- for any possible valuation they may draw for the future invention (the patent), the marginal bene…t from any positive R&D amount is always lower than the marginal cost, which makes them decide not to participate in the contest. Hence link formation between some …rms can form a barrier to entry for other …rms, strengthening the position of the former. In an example we show that a pairwise stable network with some …rms opting out of the market for innovation can pareto dominate, from the point of view of the …rms, the network formed by the grand coalition. Hence the barrier to entry is not necessarily welfare reducing.
When both types of networks are pairwise stable, we wish to re…ne the solution concept by studying which network structures are strongly stable by imposing immunity to coalitional deviations (Jackson and van den Nouweland [2005] ). Unfortunately strong stability proves to be too strong a re…nement as we show, again by means of an example, that there need not be any network surviving it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce the R&D cooperation stage (Section 2) followed by the competitive one (Section 3). In Section 4, we solve the model while in Section 5 we provide an example of the model with …ve …rms. In Section 6 we study the strong stability issue while Section 7 concludes.
R&D Cooperation
Modeling Networks We consider a …nite set of ex-ante identical …rms N = 1; : : : ; n with n > 2. Then, a network game is a game where every …rm i 2 N announces its intended link s ij 2 f0; 1g with all …rms j 6 = i. If …rm i wants to make a link with j, then s ij = 1 and 0 otherwise.
Since …rm i has to decide whether to link or not with all its competitors, then a strategy for a …rm i is given by s i = fs ij g j6 =i , which is a n 1 vector taken from the strategy set S i .
A link among …rms i and j will occur if and only if s ij = 1 = s ji , namely when both agree to form the partnership. In the following we describe the existence of a link among the players i and j through a binary variable ij such that ij = be the set of …rms that have a link with …rm i given the network g. Then,
i (g) = jN i (g)j is the number of …rms linked with i. To simplify the notation, g + ij means that the link ij is added to the network g. Similarly, g ij corresponds to the network g without the link ij.
We say that there exists a path between i and j if either ij = 1 or if there exists a sequence of l distinct players fk 1 ; k 2 ; :::k l g such that ik 1 = k 1 k 2 = ::: = k l 1 k l = k l j = 1: Network g is said to be a component of network g if for all i, j, i 6 = j belonging to g ; there exists a path between i and j and for i 2 g and j 2 g; if ij = 1 then j 2 g :
The empty network g 0 is characterized by i (g c ) = 0 for all i 2 N .
A network g is said to have a dominant group structure when the component
( N is complete and all j = 2 N D (g) have no links:
Main assumptions and stability concept Once a network is induced, we assume that each …rm pays a negligible but positive cost c > 0 per link formed.
Given a strategy pro…le s, the payo¤ of …rm i is given by
Given this framework strategy pro…le s = fs 1 : : : s n g is a Nash Equilibrium if
However, Nash Equilibrium in network theory is too weak a concept for modeling network formation insofar as it allows the existence of too many equilibrium networks. 5 Therefore, we adopt a stronger stability concept proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] ; pairwise stability De…nition 1 (Pairwise Stability) A network g is pairwise stable (PWS) if the following two conditions hold 1. there exists a Nash Equilibrium that supports g
Intuitively, the two conditions state that, starting from a network g, no …rm
wants to sever a link (condition 1) and no couple of …rms want to form a new one (condition 2).
When there is more than one pairwise stable network structure, it is useful to consider a re…nement introduced by Jackson and van den Nouweland [2005] ; strong stability, which corresponds to the idea that a network should be immune to coalitional deviations.
De…nition 2 (Strong Stability) A network g is strongly stable (SS) if the following two conditions hold 1. there exists a Nash Equilibrium that supports g 2. There does not exist a set of players N 0 N and a network g
It is immediate that if a network is strongly stable, it is also pairwise stable.
The reverse is not always true.
5 For example, the empty network is always a Nash Equilibrium: if no one has an incentive to make a link with i, then the best strategy for i is to reject the link formation (s ij = 0). 6 Given network g;a set of players N 0 N; can implement a network g 0 from g through deletion or adding of links solely by members of 'coalition'N 0 :
R&D Competition
We now model how the formation of weak cooperation in ‡uences the (expected) payo¤s during the patent contests.
We assume that the creation of a new link ij allows …rms i and j to improve their expected prospects from a patentable invention. More precisely we model this by assuming that …rm's i valuation of the patent given a network g; v i (g);
be uniformly distributed according to
where i (g) is the ex-ante maximal valuation of the patent given the network g. This means that the support of the distribution of values depends on the network g:
Given these assumptions each …rm chooses an R&D e¤ort level i 2 [0; 1) in order to maximize her expected payo¤ from the all pay auction. We are looking for an equilibrium of e¤ort levels which is increasing in the valuation of the …rm.
The expected payo¤ form …rm i is:
where j ( ) is the valuation of contestant j such that she also makes an e¤ort equal to : the inverse bidding function: The …rst order condition can be written as:
The left hand side is the marginal bene…t of an extra R&D e¤ort: it is the valuation for the invention times the increase in the probability of winning the contest. The right hand side is the marginal cost. It could well be that a contestant's …rst order condition is negative, even for its highest possible However, this does not necessarily mean that the network g in which a …rm j exits the race will be pairwaise stable. It could well be that there is always
another …rm i such that the network g + ij is mutually bene…cial for i and j:
In order to answer this question we need to take a look at the payo¤s of any given network. Given any network g one can use condition 6 to eliminate all non-active participants and study the payo¤s of the contest with the remaining …rms. De…ne F : ! P (N ) to be a function from the set of networks to set of subsets of …rms that selects all the active …rms for any given network structure g: Let f (g) = #F (g): Then the …rst order conditions can be manipulated (see Parreiras and Rubenchik (2006) for details) in order to obtain:
where
1 1 and = P i6 =1 i : This yields expected payo¤s :
Given these building blocks, we can summarize the timing of the patent contest in three steps: STEP 1. The network g determines the distributions i (g) of all …rms.
STEP 2. Each …rm decides whether to enter the contest or not. Following
Parreiras & Rubinchik [2006] , a …rm i will participate to the race if and only if the following condition is satis…ed:
is satis…ed. 
Solution
Before we study if there are pairwise stable networks, we will make two simplifying assumptions. First, the support only depends on the amount of links a …rm
Second, we assume that there exists a multiplicative e¤ect 8 on the expected maximal value i in such way that:
In order to …nd out which partnership structures are pairwise stable, we solve the model by backward induction. Given the expected payo¤ functions obtained above we obtain for any network g :
Given this equilibrium behavior and payo¤s in stage two, which network constellations are pairwise stable? In order to answer this question it is useful to consider the payo¤ of (a participating) …rm i when forming a link with …rm 8 We thus assume the existence of a strong strategic incentive to cooperate which corroborates empirical observations mentioned in the introduction. Even if this strong cooperative environment exists, we will show that the complete network will not always be formed. We make these assumption in order to be able to compare expected payo¤s between network g and network g + ij so as to be able to say something meaningful regarding pairwise stability. No doubt, our result could hold for more general relationships between a network and the distributions of valuations, but unfortunately, this comes at the cost of making general conclusions regarding pairwise stability.
j; given network g: Following Equation (10), the payo¤ of …rm i in the network g + ij is
Where
Looking at the linking strategy, it is straightforward to see that, given a network g and a negligible 10 linking cost c, two …rms will have an incentive to form a link if and only if both expected payo¤s are strictly increasing
which implies also that both …rms are willing to participate in the contest g +ij.
In particular, the decision to form a link is determined by the strength of three e¤ects. 
Proof: See Appendix A.
In other words, the cooperative e¤ect means that two non-connected competing …rms always have an incentive to cooperate. It is also immediately seen that:
The expected payo¤ of the patent game is increasing in the number of links.
9 A non participating …rm will prefer to abandon the race whenever the expected payo¤ from entering the race is non positive. 1 0 In fact there is a threshold value of c; e c; such that for all c < e c this is true. De…ne, for 8 g 2 ; 8i 2 N; 8j 2 N : = min g;i;j
Since the maximum amount of links a …rm can form is N 1; then let e c = N 1 : 
Proof: See Appendix C.
Naturally, if more than one equilibrium exists, we need to analyze if we can rank the various equilibria using the pareto dominance criterion. Unfortunately, the next proposition shows that the complete network can pareto dominate a dominant group network and vice versa: 
Proof: See Appendix D.
In the next section we propose an example that illustrates our model.
An example
Suppose there are N = 5 …rms that want to discover a new technology. Some possible network structures that can be formed are shown in Figure 1 and Figure   2 . The …rst step to solve the model is to obtain the maximal ex-ante bene…ts i that …rms can get in each network. Then, since less connected …rms have a lower payo¤ (Corollary 1) and consequently a higher chance of not participating to the contest, we check when they satisfy their participation constraint. For example, looking at network g 3 (Figure 3 ), we …rst calculate the participation constraints of …rms 4 and 5. If they are satis…ed, we then calculate the payo¤s of the remaining …rms knowing that all …rms will participate to the race (i.e. 1. g 2 is PWS if and only if
2. g 3 is PWS if and only if
3. g 4 is PWS if and only if
It is straightforward to see that PWS conditions for g 2 and g 3 are never satis…ed while g 4 is PWS when is large enough ( > 4 ' 1:137158). Therefore in our example there are two PWS networks
Moreover, following Proposition 3, the complete network pareto dominates g 4 only when > 3=2.
Strong Stability (SS)
The example shows us that, for a considerable range of parameters, multiple equilibria coexist. One can wonder whether it is possible to eliminate some of the equilibria by looking at re…nements of the pairwise stability concept. We do so by studying strong stability, which demands pairwise stable networks to be immune to coalitional deviations. When one pairwise stable network pareto dominates another one, it is clear that there exists a coalitional deviation from one to the other. 11 Unfortunately, as we will see below, our above example conveys that there need not exist any strongly stable network.
Lemma 2 A strongly stable network may fail to exist
An example (continued)
Recall that, a network g is SS when there is no coalition of players that …nds it pro…table to deviate from g to another network g 0 (no matter whether g 0 is pairwise stable or not). Let us use the following notation g X fi;j;kg ! g Y to indicate that players i, j and k deviate from network g X toward g Y .
1 1 Looking at our example this means that g 4 is never SS as > 3=2 because a grand coalition can pro…tably deviate to the complete network.
Strong Stability of network g c If the deviation g c f1;2;3;4g ! g 4 is pro…table, then the complete network is not SS. In order to verify such pro…tability, we must distinguish two cases.
If the deviation does not lead …rm 5 to drop out of the race (i.e. when 1 < < 3 p 4=3)), then deviating players i = 1; 2; 3; 4 are better o¤ if and
Plotting such di¤erence within the range 1 < < 3 p 4=3) (Figure 7) , we can immediately see that it is always satisifed. Consequently g c is not SS in such range because it is always pro…table to deviate from g c to g 4 .
On the other hand, if the deviation forces …rm 5 to leave the race (i.e. ! g 4 is pro…table if and only if
Therefore, whenever Merging the two cases we have that the complete network is not SS for any 1 < 3 2 . Moreover, one can prove that, whenever 3=2 < < 1:89414, three …rms will always …nd it pro…table to deviate from the full network to a network g e k with two components of three and two …rms respectively. 12 Therefore, even though the complete network pareto dominates g 4 it is still not SS when 3=2 < < b = 1:89414. 1 2 This is due to the fact that in such network both outsiders always participate so that the other three …rms will deviate only when
a condition that is satis…ed as 3=2 < < 1:89414. On the other hand, outsiders do not participate for
2 . Therefore, a deviation to g 3 is pro…table only when
which means that it is always pro…table to deviate from g 4 to g 3 whenever q 3 2
As a consequence of these results, network g 4 is PWS but never SS when indicates that strong stability may be too strong a re…nement with respect to pairwise stability.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we provide a theoretical background to sectors featured by R&D co-opetition, namely sectors where …rms cooperate in R&D even though they compete in a patent contest. Our analysis started from the observation that, during the last years, there has been an increasing number of weak partnerships among …rms that compete for the development of new products/technologies.
In this setting, we studied, by using an all-pay auction approach, how this weak collaboration a¤ects strategic decisions during the patent contest itself, and how the latter in ‡uences the possible network structures the …rms can hope to form. The all pay auction approach allows us to 1) endogenize both network formation and R&D intensities and 2) take heterogeneous and private valuations for patents into account.
We …nd that, di¤erent from previous literature, the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable network, even and especially if the bene…ts from cooperating are important. Interestingly, the other possible stable networks all have the realistic property that some …rms decide not to participate in the contest. In other words, network formation can serve as an endogenous barrier to entry.
We further show that there need not be any network that survives a well known re…nement of pairwise stability; strong stability, which imposes networks to be immune to coalitional deviations.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Let us consider the following …rm i's pro…ts in the network g
and in the network g + ij
where > 1. Suppose for simplicity that f (g) = f (g+ij) = f N , namely that no …rm decides not to participate. 13 Taking the di¤erence of the log-pro…ts, a new link is pro…table when
Simplifying some terms we have
Rewriting = 1 + and simplifying 
Rearranging terms
it is su¢ cient to prove that A and B are always positive.
A First, A is positive if and only if
B Therefore A is always positive. Now, in order to have B positive we need that log(1 + ) + log
A simple way to check this condition is to see when the right hand side is dominated by either the …rst term or the second one of the left hand side. The LHS …rst term dominates the RHS when 14 log(1+ ) log
,
On the other hand the second term of the LHS dominates the RHS when 
Network g k is PWS only when all these conditions hold. However, we can show that Equation (16) is the most restrictive.
First, Equation (16) 
a condition that is always satis…ed.
On the other hand, Equation (16) 
+ 1
which is always true. Therefore, Equation(16) is the most restrictive condition for the PWS of a dominant group network.Q.E.D.
D Proof of Proposition 3
It is straightforward to see that moving from a dominant group network to the complete one, …rms that were outside the component are better o¤ insofar as their payo¤ becomes strictly positive instead of being null. Therefore, the complete network pareto dominates a dominant group network g k only when all component members i are better o¤ when they move from g k to g c , namely 
